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Abstract
Physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms leak information, which makes them
vulnerable to so-called side-channel attacks. The problem of secure computation in the presence
of leakage is generally known as leakage resilience. In this work, we establish a connection
between leakage resilience and fault-tolerant quantum computation. We first prove that for
a general leakage model, there exists a corresponding noise model in which fault tolerance
implies leakage resilience. Then we show how to use constructions for fault-tolerant quantum
computation to implement classical circuits that are secure in specific leakage models.
1 Introduction
Modern theoretical cryptography is primarily concerned with developing schemes that are provably
secure under reasonable assumptions. While the field has been hugely successful, the threat model
considered usually doesn’t allow for the possibility of side-channel attacks—attacks on the physical
implementation of the cryptographic scheme.
Side-channel attacks have been a worry long before the advent of modern cryptography. As
early as 1943, it was discovered that a teletype used for encryption by the American military caused
spikes in an oscilloscope that could then be used to recover the plaintext [Nat07]. More recently,
side-channel attacks on cryptographic applications widely used in practice have been revealed. One
of these is the “Lucky Thirteen” attack on TLS in CBC mode [AP13], which is based on measuring
the time it takes the server to reply to a request over the network. Another recent attack [GST13]
uses acoustic cryptanalysis to attack the GnuPG implementation of RSA. The authors managed
to extract the full RSA key by measuring the noise produced by the computer while it decrypts
a set of chosen ciphertexts. Although the relevant software has since then been updated so that
these attacks are no longer possible, they highlight the importance of designing implementations
with side-channel attacks in mind.
The theoretical approach to side-channel attacks is to design protocols that are resilient against
them. This is the focus of the area known as leakage resilience. In this work, we present a way
to perform universal leakage-resilient computation, i.e. we construct a general “leakage-resilient
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compiler” that takes an arbitrary circuit and produces a new, leakage-resilient version having the
same computational functionality.
We take a novel approach to leakage resilience: fault-tolerant quantum computation. The
basic idea is that all actions performed in the execution of a classical circuit—as well as leakage
attacks on it—can be described using the formalism of quantum mechanics. Then, leakage of the
physical state of the computation is equivalent to a so-called phase error in a quantum circuit.
Since a fault-tolerant quantum computation must protect against phase errors (as well as more
conventional bit-flip errors), it is necessarily leakage-resilient. However, achieving leakage resilience
in this way would require a fault-tolerant quantum circuit. Here, we give a method for constructing
a leakage-resilient classical circuit by modifying an appropriate fault-tolerant quantum circuit.
The former mimics the latter, inheriting its leakage resilience. Our approach is similar to security
proofs of quantum key distribution in which it is shown that the operation of the actual protocol—
where the outcomes of measurements on entangled quantum states are processed classically—can
be interpreted as mimicking a fully quantum protocol for entanglement distillation, from which the
protocol derives its security [SP00].
Before introducing our general setting for leakage, it is illustrative to present a concrete example
of leakage resilience in practice. Smart cards are integrated circuits that have been widely used
for authentication and also allow the storing of sensitive data, making them portable carriers of
information such as money and medical records. Since smart cards are designed to be portable,
they are subject to a variety of physical attacks. Possible attacks include measuring the time and
the electrical current used when performing operations (power analysis). Thus, leakage resilience
is essential to the design of smart cards.
More specifically, a smart card stores some internal data, provides an interface for external
input, performs some computation on the internal data and the external input and sends the
output through an output interface. One of the design goals is that if the smart card is given to an
adversary, who can send inputs to and read off outputs from it, the adversary should not be able
to obtain any information about the internal data in the card, beyond what can be learned from
the regular output of the computation. This design goal is what we mean by leakage resilience.
However, whereas smart cards are usually designed to be resilient against specific attacks, we are
interested in larger classes of attacks. Additionally, smart cards are devices that perform one fixed
function, while our goal is to have leakage resilience for general functions.
Our general setting for leakage is as follows: first, an honest party (Alice) inputs a circuit C
that computes a function f along with a secret y. Then, the adversary (Eve) is given black-box
access to the circuit, so that she can interactively send inputs, denoted x, to the circuit and gets the
corresponding outputs (f(x, y)). She also receives a description of the circuit. Additionally, with
each interaction Eve obtains leaked bits according to the leakage model. Roughly, the goal is that
Eve should not learn any more information about y than what she would get from f(x, y) alone. This
setting will be formalized in Section 2 using the abstract cryptography framework [MR11, Mau12].
1.1 Previous work
The question of hiding internal computation from an eavesdropper is related to the problem of
program obfuscation. Obfuscation can be seen as a “worst-case leakage resilience”, in which the
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internal state must be protected even if the whole execution leaks to the adversary.1 However, it is
known that obfuscating programs is impossible in general [BGI+01]. Thus, if we want any leakage
resilience at all, the type of leakage allowed has to be restricted in some way.
This is not necessarily a problem because in practice the adversary has its own limitations when
trying to obtain information from the system. Here we list a few results in the field, although the
list is by no means comprehensive. Ishai et al. [ISW03] considered adversaries that can learn the
values of a bounded number of wires in the circuit. Micali and Reyzin [MR04] introduced the “only
computation leaks information” assumption, in which the leakage at each step of the computation
only depends on data that was used in the computation. Faust et al. [FRR+10] consider one
model where the adversary gets a function of all of the circuit’s state (that is, the output and all
intermediate computations), the restriction being that the leakage function must be computable
in AC0, the family of circuits containing only AND, NOT and OR gates (with unbounded fan-in)
and having constant depth and polynomial size. They also consider noisy leakage, where the whole
state of the circuit leaks, but the adversary only receives a noisy version of the leaked state, each
bit being flipped with some probability. A common further assumption is to use a small component
of trusted hardware [GR10, FRR+10, DF12].
Despite these advances, relating leakage models to actual leakage seen in practice has so far
proved to be challenging. Standaert et al. [SPY13] present a few problems with the “bounded
leakage” assumption, in which the leakage at each computation step is assumed to be bounded; see
also [SPY+10].
Our work is loosely related to the one of Smith et al. [CGS02], where techniques from fault-
tolerant quantum computation are used to develop a construction for secure multi-party quantum
computation. Given that multi-party computation techniques are commonly used for leakage re-
silience (in particular, secret sharing [ISW03, DF12, GR10]), the connection between fault tolerance
and leakage resilience is perhaps unsurprising. However, the construction of Smith et al. was in-
herently quantum, whereas our construction runs on a classical machine.
1.2 Our contribution
We establish a relation between leakage-resilient (classical) computation and fault-tolerant quantum
computation, which are formally defined in Section 2. Specifically, we show how methods of the
latter can be used to construct leakage-resilient compilers, which transform a given circuit into
another (classical) circuit with the same computational functionality as well as resistance to leakage.
The starting point in relating leakage-resilient classical computation and fault-tolerant quantum
computation is the observation that any classical logical operation can be regarded as a quantum
operation performing the same action in the so-called computational basis. (Appendix A provides
a brief background on the formalism and tools of quantum information theory necessary here.)
Then, as we show in Section 3, any given leakage model may be interpreted as specific model of
phase noise afflicting the corresponding quantum circuit.
Phase noise is not the most general type of quantum noise. Nonetheless, as we show in Theo-
rem 1, if fault tolerance is possible for a given noise model—meaning roughly that error correction
is performed frequently enough that the encoded information essentially never suffers from errors—
the quantum computation is resilient to leakage of the corresponding leakage model. However, we
1One explicit connection between obfuscation and a specific leakage model (the “only computation leaks informa-
tion” model of Micali and Reyzin [MR04]) has been made in [BCG+11]; see also [GR12].
3
want to make classical circuits leakage-resilient and do not necessarily want to carry out a quantum
computation to achieve this goal. Fortunately, the structure of certain quantum error-correcting
codes is such that we can mimic the error-correcting steps with classical circuits.
Following this approach, we construct a general leakage-resilient compiler by mimicking the ba-
sic fault tolerant components of the fault-tolerant scheme in [AGP05] using classical components.
Section 4 describes how to transform into classical circuits certain simple types of quantum circuits
that serve as building blocks for arbitrary circuits. Section 5 then presents a fault-tolerant imple-
mentation of the Toffoli gate, a gate that is universal for classical computation. Combining this
with the results of Section 4 then gives a leakage-resilient compiler.
As in other works, our construction assumes the existence of a part of the circuit that is leak-free.
The assumption is however minimal: the only leak-free component we use is a source of (uniformly)
random bits. Using the construction, one can transform an arbitrary classical circuit into a circuit
that is resilient to leakage arising in any model for which reliable quantum computation is possible
under the corresponding phase noise model. One particular leakage model that translates into a
well-studied quantum noise model is that of independent leakage, in which the value of each wire
of the circuit leaks with some fixed probability. While potentially too restrictive (in particular,
the independence assumption implies that the adversary does not choose the wires that leak), its
simplicity allows for an easy interpretation in the quantum scenario as independent phase errors,
for which various fault-tolerant constructions are known. This model is used in our construction
in Section 5. Leakage models that include correlations lead to error models that have yet to be
analyzed.
We stress that rather than presenting a specific leakage resilient scheme, the contribution of this
work aims to provide a novel approach to leakage resilience and connect this field of cryptography to
the research area of fault-tolerant quantum computation. Our work thus shows how results achieved
in one area (e.g., new threshold theorems for quantum fault tolerance) can be translated to the
other (e.g., bounds on the performance of leakage resilient compilers). Our hope is that our result
will inspire research developing the relationship between fault tolerance and leakage resilience. In
Section 6 we discuss possible future directions for this line of work.
2 Definitions
2.1 Abstract cryptography framework
In order to define leakage resilience we use the abstract cryptography framework [MR11, Mau12],
of which we give a short summary. From an abstract viewpoint, constructing a protocol amounts
to assuming that a certain set of real resources is available and then using them to build a new
resource, termed an ideal resource. By way of composition, the ideal resource can then again be
used as a real resource in another protocol to build a more complex ideal resource.
For instance, the one-time pad construction assumes that a resource giving out a secret key
is available along with an authentic channel. It is then shown that these resources can emulate a
secure channel. In this case, the ideal resource is the secure channel, whereas the authentic channel
along with a shared secret key is used as a real resource. On the other hand, in a protocol for
authentication, the authentic channel takes the role of the ideal resource, and the real resource is
a completely insecure channel together with a secret key.
In this framework, resources are a type of systems, which are defined as abstract objects which
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can be composed. Each system has an interface set I, and interfaces can be connected in order to
form new systems. Resources are systems where each interface corresponds to one party that has
access to it. As an example of a resource, we can define a private channel between honest parties A
and B subject to possible eavesdropping by E as a resource that takes inputs from A and outputs
them at B. Since the resource gives E no outputs, the channel is private by definition. Note that
this holds whether E acts honestly or dishonestly; in abstract cryptography the goal is to emulate
the behavior of ideal resources in all situations, not just when assuming certain parties are honest
and others dishonest.
To emulate an ideal resource from given resources, the latter may be composed. Furthermore,
each party can act on their interface using a converter, which is also modelled as a system. A
converter has an “inside” interface, connected to the resource, and an “outside” interface, which is
used by the parties. A protocol specifies a converter for each party acting honestly and is applied
to a real resource. In the security arguments, we will also consider converters applied to the ideal
resource by parties acting dishonestly. These are termed simulators. We denote composition of
systems by juxtaposition, so that, for instance, the resource formed by plugging converter piA into
the resource R is denoted by piAR.
In order to allow for constructions that do not perfectly match a desired ideal resource but only
approximate it, we need a notion of distance d between two resources, which must be a pseudo-
metric d on the set of resources. Typically we consider the distance to be the maximal advantage
that a system trying to distinguish between the two resources (the distinguisher) can have. Given
two resources R and S and a distance d, we also write R ≈ε S to denote d(R,S) ≤ ε.
In this work we only ever need to consider two parties, A and E, where A is assumed to be
honest. To keep the formal treatment simple, we restrict ourselves to this case. In this scenario,
what it means for a protocol to securely emulate an ideal resource S given a resource R takes
a particularly simple form. It reduces to two different conditions, one where E is dishonest and
another where E is honest—that is, it follows the protocol. We use the following definition of
security, which, for our scenario, is sufficient to imply the definition presented in [MR11].2
Definition 1. Let R and S be resources with interface set I = {A,E}. We say that a protocol
pi = {piA, piE} securely constructs S from R within ε if there exists a simulator σE such that
piAR ≈ε σES and (1)
piApiER ≈ε S. (2)
2.2 Leakage resilience
Using the abstract cryptography framework, we can now define leakage resilience by specifying the
corresponding ideal and real resource. They are two-party resources, with parties that we denote
by Alice (A) and Eve (E), where Alice is assumed to be honest.
Ideal resource. Our goal is to be able to compute a function that takes an input to be given
by the adversary, and an additional input that corresponds to the initial secret. First we describe
intuitively the kind of resource that we want. At the beginning, Alice inputs the circuit to be
executed along with the secret input. Then, a description of the circuit is given to Eve, who can
execute it as a black box freely.
2We note, however, that in the general case one needs to use additional constructions, termed filters. We refer
to [Mau12, MR11] for more details.
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In light of this informal description, we define the ideal resource S as follows. Alice initially
inputs a secret y and a description of a circuit C that evaluates a function f . Eve can send inputs x,
to which she receives outputs f(x, y). The ideal functionality also outputs C to Eve. The resource
is shown in Figure 1a.
What this definition implies is that information about y can only leak through f(x, y) and C.
As a concrete example, let C be a circuit implementing an encryption algorithm f that encrypts
inputs x using the secret key y. In establishing security for a cryptographic scheme, one assumes
that the secret key is completely hidden from Eve. In the example, this assumption is ensured by
the way the ideal resource is defined, since the only way information about y could leak to Eve is
through the ciphertext f(x, y).
This example also illustrates that security and leakage resilience are separate goals: we place
no restrictions on f , so even if the function reveals some information about y that would be of
no consequence for leakage resilience. Instead, leakage resilience only ensures that no additional
information about y leaks.
Real resource. Informally, the real resource (which we denote by R) is a “leaky” version of the
ideal resource, in which additional information becomes available to Eve. Alice’s interface allows
her to input a secret y and a circuit C that evaluates a function f . Eve’s interface allows her to
send inputs x, to which she gets outputs C(x, y), and additionally send leakage requests l, getting
leakages l′. As in the ideal resource, Eve also gets C. The idea is that Eve can use R as a black
box, but also obtain additional information from the leakage which might reveal something about
the secret. This scenario is represented in Figure 1b.
S
y
C
x
C(x, y)
C
(a)
R
y
C
x
C(x, y)
l
l′
C
(b)
Figure 1: (a) ideal resource for leakage resilience and (b) real resource. In both cases, Alice has
access to the left interface and Eve has access to the right interface.
In order to satisfy the conditions in Definition 1, we need a protocol pi to construct the ideal
resource S from the real resource R. The first condition in Definition 1 is depicted in Figure 2.
Our description of the real resource captures leakage in a very general form, in the sense that
C, l and l′ may be arbitrary. However, in order for leakage resilience to be possible, it is necessary
to specify how the leakage requests l are chosen. Hence, we construct schemes that are resilient
against leakage with some particular structure. In order to formalize this, we’ll make the scenario
presented above more concrete, by restricting the interactions in the following way. Eve interacts
with the resource in rounds. In each round, she inputs pairs (x, l) and receives outputs (f(x, y), l′).3
The particular strategy used to choose the leakage requests l is referred to as a leakage model
L. The leakage model is a set of allowed leakage requests. A leakage request is a probability
3We could have the function output be additionally a function of l; this situation would capture tampering, in
which Eve can introduce faults to the wires in the circuit [IPSW06].
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piA R
y
C
y
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x
C(x, y)
l
l′
C
≈ε S σE
y
C
x
C(x, y)
C
x
C(x, y)
l
l′
C
Figure 2: The first condition of Definition 1 applied to leakage resilience. In order to prove that the
converter piA is part of a leakage-resilient protocol pi, one has to show the existence of a simulator
σE such that execution of piA running with the real resource R is indistinguishable from execution
of the ideal resource S with σE .
distribution over leakage functions. That is, if the set of possible leakage functions is {li}, Eve
sends l = {(li, pi)}, where li is chosen with probability pi. Each li is a function of the set of values
assigned to the wires in the circuit, which we denote by WC(x, y) (when the circuit is given inputs
x and y). If the function lj is chosen, Eve receives l
′ = lj(WC(x, y)). Not that the output of lj may
or may not include the index j, depending on the leakage model.
As an example, Eve could choose at every round a bounded number of wires of the circuit
to leak. (These are the “probing attacks” considered in [ISW03].) Or one could restrict Eve to
leakage functions that are computed with constant-depth circuits [FRR+10]. In any case, we define
leakage-resilient compilers with respect to a particular leakage model in the following way. In the
definition below, S and R are respectively the ideal resource and the real resource defined above.
Definition 2. The protocol pi is an ε-leakage-resilient compiler against leakage model L if it securely
constructs S from R within ε, where the leakage requests are drawn from L.
Remark 1. When constructing the protocol pi = {piA, piE}, we’ll focus our attention on the converter
piA. This is due to the fact that given an appropriate piA, it’s always easy to construct a converter
piE such that Condition (2) in Definition 1 is satisfied. We construct piE as follows. piE relays inputs
x from Eve to R and decodes the encoded output C(x, y), which is then passed to Eve. It also
decodes the encoded circuit C before passing it to Eve. Crucially, piE does not provide the leakage
interface (receiving l and outputting l′) to Eve, effectively shielding the leakage from her.
Independent leakage. In this paper (Section 5) we provide as a concrete example an explicit
leakage-resilient compiler for a concrete leakage model which we call independent leakage. Indepen-
dent leakage is characterized by having every wire in the circuit potentially leak, each with a fixed
probability p.
This model can be formalized in the following way. Let n be the number of wires in the circuit.
We label each wire in the circuit with an index i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Now let w be a binary string
of length n and lw(x, y) be the values of the wires i with wi = 1 when the circuit has (x, y) as
input, along with the string w to indicate which wires have leaked. For every round of interaction,
the probability pw that the leakage function Lw was chosen is given by pw = Pr(X = |w|) where
X follows a binomial distribution with parameters n and p. The leakage model L is then L =
{(lw, pw) : w ∈ {0, 1}n}. (Note that there’s only one possible leakage request.)
Leak-free components. Many of the leakage-resilient constructions require a small component
of the circuit to be trusted or “leak-free”, meaning its internal wires don’t leak to Eve. For
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our construction, this includes wires coming out of leak-free components. We incorporate this
requirement in our definition of leakage resilience by adding the restriction that the leakage function
l may not depend on any wires inside the leak-free components, or the wires coming out of them.
The only leak-free component we use in this work is a source of random bits: a gate that takes
no input and outputs a uniformly distributed random bit (which is assumed not to leak). This
is used in the part of our proof where we transform a quantum circuit into a classical one; we
leave open the question of whether this is necessary in general. We note that our requirement is
different from than the one used in [FRR+10]: we require only uniformly distributed bits, while their
transformation requires bits distributed according to an arbitrary (although fixed) distribution. On
the other hand, the output wires from their leak-free component is allowed to leak, whereas we
require that leak-free components not leak before interacting with other components.
2.3 Fault tolerance
A noisy quantum circuit E is an implementation of a unitary U acting on subsystems S (the data
subsystem) and E (the environment). The idea of fault tolerance is to perform computations on
a noisy circuit reliably, by using the noisy circuit to execute encoded operations such that at any
point of the computation, the encoded state of the data is close to the state of an ideal circuit that
implements U perfectly.
More precisely, let C be a quantum circuit with inputs and outputs in H⊗k2 . We assume that
the circuit acts on classical inputs; this is done by preparing a known state |0〉⊗k and then encoding
a classical input x into it, obtaining the state denoted |x〉. The possible input states |x〉 form the
computational basis. Then, for any x, the circuit implements the action of a unitary Ux on |0〉⊗k.
A fault-tolerant simulation for C works as follows. Let C˜ be a noisy quantum circuit acting
on H⊗n2 . The noise incurred on the circuit is specified by a noise model N , the form of which is
defined in Section 3. The data subsystem is initialized in the state |0〉⊗n. The input x ∈ {0, 1}k is
then encoded in a quantum error-correcting code of length n; we denote the encoded input by |x〉.
Execution then proceeds the same way as in the ideal circuit, except that the gates are replaced
by encoded gates (i.e., operations on encoded data). We can thus compare the states of C and C˜
at an arbitrary step of the computation. Additionally, after each step of the computation, error
correction is performed in order to keep the state of the circuit in the encoded space of the code.
We say that C˜ is ε-reliable against noise N if for every step, the state of C is equal to the logical
value of the state of C˜ except with probability ε.
We note that the way we use fault tolerance is slightly different from the usual treatment. As
defined above (and as it’s commonly done), the inputs are encoded as part of the circuit. But our
circuits also receive additional encoded inputs. This is done purely for convenience and does not
make the definition stronger.
The focus in fault tolerance is in implementing so-called gadgets—components such as logical
gates and error correction, that can then be used as building blocks to construct reliable circuits.
The goal is usually to implement a set of gates that is universal for quantum computation. However,
as we will see in Section 5, since we only seek to perform classical computation, we only need a
restricted set of gates.
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3 Leakage models and quantum noise
In this section we show that for an arbitrary classical circuit with leakage according to some leakage
model L, we can view the circuit as a noisy quantum circuit with a corresponding noise model N ,
and that if the quantum circuit is reliable with respect to N then it is also leakage-resilient against
L. To this end, we must first make matters more concrete. A general quantum noise model is an
operation N on quantum states on H⊗n2 and takes the form
N (ρ) =
∑
k
pkEkρE
†
k, (3)
where Ek are arbitrary operators taking H⊗n2 to itself and pk ≥ 0 with
∑
k pk = 1. If Ek has the
form Ek =
⊗n
i=1 Z
ai,k
i for ai,k ∈ {0, 1} and Z specified by Z|x〉 = (−1)x|x〉, then we call N a phase
noise model.
The following lemma relates classical leakage models and quantum noise models.
Lemma 1. For any circuit C running with a leakage request {lj , pj}mj=1 taken from a leakage model
L, there exists a noise model N such that C, viewed as a quantum circuit, is a quantum circuit
subject to noise N . Furthermore, N has the form
N (ρ) = 1
d
m∑
j=1
pj
d−1∑
k=0
F kj ρ(F
k
j )
†, (4)
where F kj is the operator taking |s〉 to ωklj(s)|s〉 and ω is a primitive dth root of unity.
Now we can state the formal connection between leakage resilience and reliable quantum com-
putation:
Theorem 1. For every circuit C and leakage model L, there exists a noise model N as specified
in Lemma 1 such that for any ε-reliable (against N ) implementation C˜ of C with encoding function
y 7→ |y〉, the protocol pi = {piA, piE} that, given (y, C) as input, outputs (|y〉, C˜), and piE is as specified
in Remark 1, is a 2
√
ε-leakage-resilient compiler against L.
Proof of Lemma 1. First consider the case where L is such that at each round, a single leakage
function l is chosen. Let S be the subsystem representing the wire assignments s := WC(x, y) in
the circuit and E be Eve’s subsystem. In quantum-mechanical terms, the action of the leakage is
the transformation
|s〉S ⊗ |0〉E → |s〉S ⊗ |l(s)〉E (5)
for each s. To determine the action of the leakage on system S itself, consider an arbitrary su-
perposition state |ψ〉S = ∑s√ps|s〉S for some probability distribution ps. After applying the
transformation and tracing out subsystem E, ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| becomes
ρ → N (ρ) =
∑
s
∑
s′:l(s′)=l(s)
√
psps′ |s〉〈s′|, (6)
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as all coherence is lost between parts of the state with different values of l. But this is also the
output state if the transformation were instead
|s〉S ⊗ |0〉E → 1√
d
∑
k
ωkl(s)|s〉S ⊗ |k〉E = 1√
d
∑
k
F k|s〉S ⊗ |k〉E , (7)
where d is the size of the output of l, ω a primitve dth root of unity, and F k the operator taking
|s〉 to ωkl(s)|s〉. The equivalence of these two maps can be seen by tracing out E. Thus, the noise
model can be expressed as
N (ρ) = 1
d
d−1∑
k=0
F kρ(F k)†. (8)
Now consider the case where the leakage function is chosen probabilistically from a set {lj}mj=1,
where lj is chosen with probability qj. In this case, a corresponding noise model is a convex
combination of noise operators of the form in (8). That is, we can write
N (ρ) = 1
d
m∑
j=1
qj
d−1∑
k=0
F kj ρ(F
k
j )
† (9)
where F kj is the operator taking |s〉 to ωklj(s)|s〉.
Proof of Theorem 1. Every leakage request from L has a corresponding noise model as given by
Lemma 1. The fault-tolerant implementation of the circuit C includes a compiled circuit C as
well as a method to encode inputs. The converter piA receives the secret y as well as a circuit as
input, and outputs the encoded secret |y〉 and C. Following the fault-tolerant construction, inputs
x received from E are encoded in |x〉, the quantum circuit is used to compute
∣∣∣C(x, y)〉 and the
decoded output is sent back to E. We therefore have a scenario as in Figure 1b.
We now have to show the existence of a simulator σ such that condition (1) (Fig. 2) is satisfied.
We’ll prove that such a simulator exists by showing that for any step of the computation, the
leakage received by E is independent of the circuit’s current state (that is, the intermediate values
encoded by its wires).
By Lemma 1, the leakage model results in noise N on the quantum circuit C. Since C is
ε-reliable against N , there can be no errors on encoded quantum information at any point of
the computation except with probability ε (otherwise, the state of the reliable circuit would be
different from the state in the ideal circuit). Now observe that the action of the ideal circuit is
a unitary operation, and by undoing this at the output of the actual circuit, the result would be
an approximate identity channel (having trivial action) connecting the input of the circuit to its
output. According to [KSW08, Theorem 3], the channel to the eavesdropper must therefore have
an approximately constant output, regardless of the input to the circuit. (It would also be possible
to use an uncertainty principle recently derived by one of us for this argument [RS14].) Specifically,
since the circuit is ε-reliable, the circuit followed by the reverse of the ideal unitary action is ε close
to an identity channel in the relevant norm (see [KSW08] for details), and this implies that the
eavesdropper’s output is 2
√
ε close to a channel with a constant output. Therefore, the state at any
point in the circuit, which we denote by |s〉, is independent of l(WC(x, y)) (except with probability
2
√
ε).
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We now note that for the case of an adaptive adversary, l′ can depend on previous inputs and
outputs, as well as previous leakages, since the choice of l can depend on those values. But because
those values are also available to the simulator, and because l′ is independent of the logical value
of s, l′ can be generated by the simulator.
4 From quantum to classical circuits
Our goal is to have classical leakage resilience, and fault-tolerant techniques yield a circuit that in
general does not have a classical translation. In this section, we show how to make a particular set
of quantum components classical. Then, in Section 5, we use these components to make a fault-
tolerant implementation of a quantum gate that is universal for classical computation—namely,
the Toffoli gate. Due to the fact that the components have a classical translation, we also have a
leakage-resilient classical gate.
In order to show the equivalence between the quantum and classical circuits, we analyze each
component in the following scenario: we assume that the quantum component has Z basis inputs
(i.e., the inputs are classical), and that after execution the outputs are measured in the Z basis. We
then show that for each component there exists a classical circuit that, when given the same inputs,
gives the same outputs as the quantum component after measuring. We then use the components
to construct encoded gadgets that will be used to implement the Toffoli gate. Since the components
have a classical translation, the gadgets and the Toffoli gate have one as well.
In order to be able to combine the classical translation with Theorem 1, we need it to preserve
the form of the original quantum circuit, so that the connection between leakage and noise model
can be made explicitly. This is achieved by having, for each component, a classical translation that
has the same wires as the quantum component.
For the classical scenario, we assume that we can generate random bits in a leak-free manner.
We’ll see that this is needed in order to make state preparation of |+〉 classical. We prove the
following result.
Theorem 2. Let C be a quantum circuit accepting classical states as input and containing only
X,Z, CNOT, CZ and Toffoli gates, state preparation of |0〉 and |+〉 and measurement in the X
and Z bases. Then each gate G in the circuit can be replaced by a classical circuit G′ with the same
wires as G. Furthermore, assuming a leak-free source of random bits, there exist procedures for
state preparation of |0〉 and |+〉 and measurement in the X and Z bases such that each of them can
be replaced by a classical circuit with the same wires. If all these replacements are made, then the
resulting classical circuit C′ gives the same outputs as applying C followed by measuring its outputs
in the Z basis.
Proof. Out of the gates we use, X, CNOT and Toffoli are classical, and therefore their classical
translations are trivial. The Z gate flips the input’s phase; as we’re assuming the inputs and
outputs to be classical, it corresponds classically to the identity gate. The same holds for CZ.
There are two bare qubits we need to prepare: |0〉 and |+〉. The classical translation of preparing
a |0〉 is just preparation of 0. To determine the translation of preparing |+〉, note that immediate
measurement in the Z basis would yield a random bit. We can thus translate state preparation of
|+〉 to the classical scenario by preparing 0 and then adding a random bit r to it, which we assume
to be generated in a leak-free manner, so that it’s hidden from the adversary.
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The output doesn’t correspond univocally to |+〉; if we had prepared |−〉, we’d get the same
output. But we can show that from the point of view of a (classical) adversary that can see all the
wires in the circuit, except for the leak-free component, this preparation procedure is equivalent to
one that prepares |+〉, shown in Figure 3.
|0〉 I Z |+〉
|+〉 • H •
Figure 3: Preparation of |+〉.
The second wire, shown inside the dashed box, is in the leak-free part of the circuit. The state
at the point I is |+〉〈+| + |−〉〈−|; this is the state used in the actual (classical) circuit. The figure
shows how we could then correct this state using the leak-free component, so that in the end we get
|+〉. Since the correction operation has no effect on the Z-basis value, it can be omitted. Therefore
if we use the circuit in Figure 3 for preparation of |+〉 in the circuit C, the classical translation
amounts to initializing a register to 0 and then adding a (leak-free) random bit to it.
Measurement in the X basis can be done in a similar way. Measuring X projects the state |ψ〉
onto one of the operator’s eigenspaces; the projection operators are given by Pi =
1
2(1+(−1)iX) for
i ∈ {0, 1} and the post-measurement state is given by ρ = ∑1i=0 Pi|ψ〉〈ψ|Pi = 12∑1i=0Xi|ψ〉〈ψ|Xi.
Hence measuring in the X basis is equivalent to a random bit flip, which we can simulate in the
classical circuit by adding a random bit.
The significance of this theorem is that we can use these operations (Section 5) to implement a
reliable Toffoli gate, a reversible circuit that is universal for classical computation, for independent
(phase) noise. This noise consists of letting every wire in the circuit be subject to a phase error4
with a fixed probability p. We’ll see that this corresponds to the leakage model of independent
leakage, where each wire in the circuit can leak with probability p.
5 Leakage-resilient gadgets
Our fault-tolerant construction follows [AGP05], which works in the model of independent phase
noise where each wire in the circuit is subject to a phase error with probability p. This phase
noise model is related to the independent leakage model, where each wire in the circuit leaks with
probability p. Leaking the state of one wire is equivalent to introducing one phase error, as seen in
Figure 4.
This relation also provides a more direct relation between fault tolerance and leakage resilience
than the one given in Theorem 1: No bits can leak if all the errors are corrected, and therefore an
ε-reliable circuit is ε-leakage-resilient.
In order to construct a leakage-resilient compiler, we just need to implement a set of fault-
tolerant gates that is universal for classical computation. We only use the components in the
statement of Theorem 2, so that we are able to make the implementation classical. A typical
4A phase error is an event where a phase flip can be introduced with probability 1/2.
12
•
|0〉
=
•
|0〉 H Z H
=
Z
|+〉 • H
Figure 4: Leaking one bit (encoded into the top wire) is equivalent to introducing a phase error.
approach is to implement the NAND gate. However, quantum gates are reversible, hence it’s
easier to implement a universal set of reversible gates. We have chosen the Toffoli gate, defined by
T (a, b, c) = (a, b, ab⊕ c), which is universal.
The construction we develop in the remainder of this section only uses the components specified
in Theorem 2. By this theorem, for each component there exists a classical translation with the
same wires as the original quantum component, and therefore we can apply the relationship between
independent phase noise and independent leakage explained above directly (or, in general, we could
apply Lemma 1). We have the following result.
Corollary 1. Let L be the independent leakage model and assume the probability of leakage p
satisfies p < 10−5. For any ε > 0 there exists a ε-leakage-resilient compiler pi that, given an
arbitrary reversible classical circuit C with l locations and depth d as input, outputs a classical
circuit C with l′ = O(l polylog(l/ε)) and depth d′ = O(dpolylog(l/ε)).
This corollary follows from the implementation of the Toffoli gate and the accuracy threshold
theorem of [AGP05], along with Theorem 2 and the relationship between independent phase noise
and independent leakage.
Given the construction for the Toffoli gate, we have a method of compiling an arbitrary circuit
into a private one that works as follows. First, we convert the circuit into one using only Toffoli
gates. As we’ll see, our fault-tolerant implementation of the Toffoli gate involves only X,Z and
CNOT gates, state preparation, measurement in the X and Z bases, and error correction. Hence
it has a classical translation due to Theorem 2. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, the resulting circuit
is leakage-resilient against independent leakage.
The construction in [AGP05] works by encoding qubits in the Steane [[7, 1, 3]] code [Ste96]. Fault
tolerance is achieved by constructing encoded gadgets that are resilient to errors “in first order”
—that is, if the physical circuit has probability of failure ε, then the encoded circuit has probability
of failure O(ε2). One can then achieve an arbitrary degree of accuracy by code concatenation.
In what follows, we present the fault-tolerant gadgets we use in the construction of the Toffoli
gate.
Measurement. A Z basis measurement can be done by measuring transversally. For the Steane
code,
∣∣0〉 is an equal superposition of all the even-weight codewords of the Hamming code, and ∣∣1〉 is
an equal superposition of the odd-weight codewords (Section A.3 has a review of the Steane code).
Thus we can determine which state was prepared by computing the parity of the measurement
outcomes. Since phase errors don’t affect the outcomes, the procedure is fault-tolerant.
X basis measurement can thus be done by applying X = X1X2X3 controlled by |+〉 and then
measuring in the Z basis. Phase errors only propagate from the data to the ancilla |+〉 state, which,
as argued in the proof of theorem 2, can be assumed to be prepared perfectly, since classically they
correspond to generating a random bit. This ensures that the procedure is fault-tolerant.
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Error correction. Error correction consists of syndrome extraction, in which the errors are
diagnosed, and a recovery step, performed in order to transform the state back into the correct
one. First, notice that since we’re performing computation on Z basis states and we assume that
only phase noise is possible, the recovery step would always consist of applying Z operators and
by the remarks in Theorem 2 can never change the outcome of the computation. Therefore only
the syndrome extraction step is necessary. For that we use a method known as Steane error
correction [Ste97, Got09], for which syndrome extraction reduces to X basis measurement.
CNOT and X gates. For the Steane code, the X gate can be applied transversally, that is,
X = ⊗7i=1Xi. The CNOT gate can also be easily seen to be transversal, in the sense that every
qubit in the first block only interacts with the corresponding qubit in the second block.
State preparation. We first describe the state preparation of
∣∣0〉. It is accomplished by preparing
7 |0〉 states and then performing Steane (phase) error correction. This method consists of taking
the state |0〉⊗7 and then performing a CNOT gate with this state as target and an ancilla state ∣∣0〉
as control. The ancilla is then measured in the Z basis. This, of course, has an obvious problem—in
order to execute the circuit, we need
∣∣0〉, which is exactly the state we are trying to prepare. But
before addressing this issue, let us see why it works. The outcomes of the measurement of
∣∣0〉 after
the transversal CNOT with |0〉⊗7 determine the eigenvalues of the X-type stabilizers of the code.
The original state |0〉⊗7 is projected onto the subspace associated with the particular measurement
outcomes. We can then map the state into the codespace by changing the eigenvalues as needed.
But in fact recovery is not necessary, since it could only change the phase of the state. As long as
we have the information about the eigenvalues, we might as well adopt the resulting state as
∣∣0〉.
In order to prepare the ancilla
∣∣0〉, we use the circuit shown in [AGP05, Fig. 12]. We note that,
since the circuit acts on physical qubits, it’s not fault-tolerant. The usual way to prepare an ancilla
state fault-tolerantly is to perform a verification step after encoding, where the state is rejected
and the procedure repeated if the verification detects too many errors. However, this doesn’t help
us because there’s no clear classical analogue; the circuit wouldn’t “know” when to reject a state,
since phase errors don’t show up in the classical picture.
Instead, we use the ancilla verification method developed in [DA07]. In this method, the ancilla
state is prepared, interacts with the data transversally and is subsequently decoded. The decoding
is done in such a way that errors due to a single fault in the ancilla preparation can be perfectly
distinguished and the data block can be corrected. In our case, we can decode by measuring the
phase-error syndrome, which for the Steane code reduces to X basis measurement.
Now we can use
∣∣0〉 along with |+〉 to prepare |+〉: we prepare ∣∣0〉, and then apply X controlled
by a random bit. As we’ve argued for X basis measurement, the circuit is fault-tolerant.
The method used to prepare
∣∣0〉 can also be used to prepare the “Shor state” |even7〉, which is
a superposition of all the even-weight words in {0, 1}7 and is used in the construction of the Toffoli
ancilla state (below). Our method to prepare and verify |even7〉 is the same as the one presented
in [DA07] for the cat state, except it’s done in the rotated basis (|even7〉 is obtained from the cat
state by applying the Hadamard gate transversally). For more details, see Appendix B.
Toffoli gate. The gadget for the Toffoli gate is shown in Figure 5a. The correctness of the circuit
can be verified by inspection. However we’ve not shown how to execute the subcircuit in the
dashed rectangle; indeed, this subcircuit uses a Toffoli gate, which is exactly what we’re trying
to implement. Instead, we use an alternative circuit to prepare the state
∣∣Θ〉 = ∣∣000〉 + ∣∣100〉 +∣∣010〉+ ∣∣111〉, which is the output of the subcircuit in the dashed rectangle. The alternative circuit
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is shown in Figure 5b.
|+〉 • • • • X x
|+〉 • • Z X • y∣∣0〉 Z z + xy
|x〉 Z •
|y〉 Z •
|z〉 • X •
(a)
|+〉 •
|+〉 •
|+〉 • X
|even7〉 parity
(b)
Figure 5: (a) Reliable Toffoli gate. (b) Construction of the Toffoli ancilla state. All the gates are
executed transversally. After computing the parity the circuit 6b is executed on the bottom block.
All the gates in Figure 5b are executed transversally, so the circuit is fault-tolerant.5 We’ll show
that if transversal CNOT and Toffoli work as the “encoded” circuits in this case, where |even7〉
encodes 0 and the “odd” state |odd7〉 encodes 1, then the circuit prepares
∣∣Θ〉. Specifically, we
need to check that output in the target of the CNOT is |even7〉 if the control is
∣∣0〉 and |odd7〉 if
the control is
∣∣1〉, and that the Toffoli gate outputs |odd7〉 if and only if both control qubits are∣∣1〉, and |even7〉 otherwise. For the CNOT, ∣∣0〉 is an equal superposition of even-weight strings, so
XORing them with even-weight strings outputs even-weight strings.
∣∣1〉 is an equal superposition
of odd-weight strings, and XORing them with even-weight strings produces odd-weight strings.
For the Toffoli gate, it suffices to prove that the transversal product of |x〉 and |y〉 is a superpo-
sition of odd-weight strings if and only if x = y = 1, and is a superposition of even-weight strings
otherwise. The key to show this claim is that the Steane code is based on a classical code C that
contains its own dual C⊥. Let H be the parity-check matrix of the code C. We have Hc = 0
for every c ∈ C. That is, each codeword is orthogonal to every row Hi of H. Since C⊥ ⊂ C,
this also applies to the codewords of C⊥, and in particular to Hi. That is, each Hi is orthogonal
to itself, which can only happen if it has even weight. Hence all the codewords in C⊥ have even
weight. Furthermore, they must have even overlap (i.e., have 1 in the same position) with every
Hi (otherwise they wouldn’t be orthogonal), and therefore also among themselves.
Thus
∣∣0〉 is the superposition of all the even-weight codewords of C, which have even overlap
among themselves by the argument above. The state
∣∣1〉 is the superposition of the codewords in
C−C⊥, which all have odd weight. Since they also satisfy the parity check H they have even overlap
with the rows of H, and therefore also with the codewords in
∣∣0〉. But they have odd overlap among
themselves. To prove this, let x, y ∈ C − C⊥. If x and y have even overlap, then x+ y ∈ C⊥ (since
it has even weight) and thus x and x+ y would have even overlap. This proves our claim.
Thus, we have a way of preparing the ancilla state
∣∣Θ〉 fault-tolerantly. Furthermore, the
classical translation is easy: the only new component here is measurement of the parity of the Shor
5Because the Toffoli gate is not a Clifford gate, it doesn’t propagate Pauli errors to Pauli errors; in particular, a
phase flip in the third block is propagated to a superposition of phase flips. This would make a classical simulation
of the level-k circuit inefficient, because the error patterns to keep track of grow exponentially on k, but again, this
is not a problem for our construction because we don’t need to perform error recovery.
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state, which can be done by measuring in the Z basis and then adding up the outcomes. Now every
component in Figure 5a has a classical translation.
6 Discussion
Theorem 1 establishes an explicit relationship between fault-tolerant quantum computation and
classical leakage resilience. Although it relates leakage and noise models (via Lemma 1), it is
not clear how the properties of the noise model relate to the properties of the leakage model in
general. However, in some cases the leakage model resulting from a given noise model has a simple
interpretation. In this work, we analyzed the independent leakage model, which corresponds to
the independent phase noise model. A possible further direction is to take a leakage model that
is used in other leakage resilience proposals and try to understand the corresponding noise model.
Conversely, one could take, say, the “local noise” model of [AGP05] and see what the corresponding
leakage model looks like.
We developed a concrete implementation of universal leakage-resilient computation based on
the fault-tolerant construction of [AGP05]. This construction works in the independent noise
model by using the concatenated Steane code. Fault tolerance is achieved assuming probability of
error per wire or gate p < 10−5 (the accuracy threshold). Along with our results, this gives us
a leakage-resilient construction for universal classical computation assuming independent leakage
with probability of leakage per wire p < 10−5.
Taking into account the fact that we only want leakage resilience rather than fault tolerance,
this threshold can be improved. An accuracy threshold for concatenated codes depends essentially
on the size of the largest gadget in the first level of encoding (a level-1 extended rectangle or 1-exRec
in the language of [AGP05]). A lower bound for the threshold is the reciprocal of the number of
pairs of locations in the largest 1-exRec. In the implementation of [AGP05], the largest 1-exRec
is the CNOT gate, but due to the simplifications in our case, the largest extended rectangles are
the gadgets for state preparation: they have 20 locations each. The number of pairs of locations is
then
(20
2
)
= 190, which gives a crude threshold estimate of p ≈ 0.5%.
As in [AGP05], we only use the Steane code, but we note that our construction works for
any CSS code based on a dual-containing classical code. A promising possibility is to use color
codes [BMD06], for which numerical evidence suggests they have good accuracy thresholds [LAR11]
but currently lack a rigorous lower bound on the threshold.
We note that while the independent leakage model looks similar to the “noisy leakage” case
of [FRR+10], they’re in fact different models. In the noisy leakage model, all bits leak, but the
adversary only receives noisy versions of these bits, each of them being flipped with probability p.
Crucially, the adversary doesn’t know which bits have leaked faithfully, whereas in our model every
bit that’s leaked is sure to arrive correctly at the adversary.
While we don’t expect existing results on fault tolerance to give direct constructions for the
leakage models commonly studied in the literature (especially since fault tolerance has only been
shown to work in very few noise models), we note that quantum fault tolerance is a stronger
requirement than classical leakage resilience: as we’ve seen in this work, translating from the
former to the latter allows us to make several simplifications. Additionally, the techniques used in
the area of fault tolerance are different from those used for leakage resilience. Hence, we expect our
result to shed new light on leakage resilience.
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Appendix A: Qubits and Stabilizers
A quantum system can be described by a complex Hilbert space. In this work, we deal only with
two-level systems. Let H2 be a two-dimensional complex Hilbert space and let {|0〉, |1〉} denote
one orthonormal basis, which we call the standard basis or the computational basis. An arbitrary
element |ψ〉 of H2 can be written |ψ〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉 were α, β ∈ C. Quantum states are represented
by unit vectors, that is, |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
Composite systems are given by the tensor product, that is, if A,B are two complex Hilbert
spaces, then the state of the system composed by A and B is an element of A⊗B.
Systems whose state is not completely known are described properly by density operators.
Suppose a system is in the state |ψi〉 with probability pi. We define the density operator ρ for the
system by
ρ =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|
States that are completely known, that is, states of the form ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, are called pure states,
while other states are called mixed states.
In the following, as well as in the rest of the text, we only deal with states that are equal
superpositions, so we omit the normalizing factor. So, for instance, we write the state |−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) simply as |0〉 − |1〉.
A.1 Pauli operators
Take the standard basis for H2 and let
1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
X,Y,Z are called the Pauli matrices. They anticommute with each other. Furthermore, an
arbitrary matrix A on H2 can be written A = a01 + a1X + a2Y + a3Z with a0, a1, a2, a3 ∈ C.
Similarly, operators on H⊗n2 can also be written in terms of Pauli matrices. Let Pn be the set of
operators of the form ik
⊗n
i=1 Pi where k ∈ Z and Pi ∈ {1,X, Y, Z}. The set Pn is a nonabelian
group; it’s called the Pauli group on n qubits. Because Y = iXZ, the group is generated by X and
Z (up to a phase factor); that is, Pn = 〈i1,X1, . . . ,Xn, Z1, . . . , Zn〉, where Xi denotes the operator
that acts as X on the ith qubit, and similarly for Zi. An arbitrary matrix on H⊗n2 can be written
as a linear combination of elements of Pn.
Consider now a system S subject to noise from the environment E. By the above discussion,
the system evolves as
|ψ〉S |0〉E →
∑
k
Ek|ψ〉A|ek〉E
where the states |ek〉 are not necessarily orthogonal, and {Ek} is a set of linearly independent
Pauli operators. We call each of them a Pauli error. We say a Pauli error Ek has weight t if it
acts nontrivially on at most t qubits. Because general errors can always be decomposed into Pauli
errors, we only need to design error correcting codes that can correct Pauli errors.
19
A.2 Error-correcting codes
A quantum error-correcting code C of length n is a subspace of H⊗n2 . Let E be a set of errors. We
say that C corrects E if there exists a recovery operator R acting on a larger system C ⊗ A such
that for every |ψ〉 ∈ C and every E ∈ E , we have trAR(E|ψ〉C |a〉A) = |ψ〉C , where |a〉 is some ancilla
state in A.
A code that corrects all errors of weight t can detect all errors of weight 2t. We define the
distance of a code as the weight of the error of smallest weight that isn’t detectable. Thus, a code
that can correct t errors has distance d = 2t+1. Analogously to the classical case, we call an error
correcting code of weight n that encodes k qubits and has distance d an [[n, k, d]] code.
Now let S be a subgroup of the Pauli group Pn not containing −1. Given such a subgroup, we
define a stabilizer code C of length n as
C = {|ψ〉 ∈ H⊗n2 | s|ψ〉 = |ψ〉,∀s ∈ S}.
The group S is called the code’s stabilizer. If the code encodes k qubits, the stabilizer is
generated by n− k elements. Errors that are not detectable are in the centralizer Z(S), the group
of operators that commute with all elements of S. Since errors act nontrivially on the codewords,
they’re not in S; thus, the distance of the code is given by the weight of the operator in Z(S)− S
with smallest weight.
Since Pn has dimension 2n, the centralizer has dimension 2n−(n−k) = n+k. ThereforeZ(S)−S
has dimension 2k. These operators can be regarded as logical operations on the codewords. We
can always choose them to be the operators Z1, . . . , Zk,X1, . . . ,Xk, satisfying the anticommutation
relation ZiXj = (−1)δijXj Zi.
Stabilizer generators are the quantum analogue of rows in the parity-check matrix of a classical
code. In fact, there’s a general class of codes known as CSS codes that are constructed from two
classical codes C1, C2 such that C
⊥
2 ⊂ C1. We won’t introduce the general theory of CSS codes
here, and instead concern ourselves with a particular CSS code known as the Steane code.
A.3 The Steane code
The Steane code [Ste96] is a [[7, 1, 3]] code that has stabilizer generators
g1 = Z1Z3Z5Z7
g2 = Z2Z3Z6Z7
g3 = Z4Z5Z6Z7
g4 = X1X3X5X7
g5 = X2X3X6X7
g6 = X4X5X6X7
and logical operators
Z = Z1Z2Z3
X = X1X2X3
The Steane code is a CSS code based on the classical [7, 4, 3] Hamming code, which we denote
here by C. The Hamming code contains its own dual, that is, C⊥ ⊂ C. The stabilizer generators
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g1, g2, g3 and g4, g5, g6 for the Steane code correspond to the rows in the parity check matrix for C,
where a 0 in the parity check matrix corresponds to the identity and 1 corresponds to Z (for the
Z-type stabilizers) or X (for the X-type stabilizers). The codewords are given by
∣∣0〉 =∑x∈C⊥ |x〉 = |0000000〉+ |0001111〉+ |0110011〉+ |1010101〉
+ |0111100〉+ |1011010〉+ |1100110〉∣∣1〉 =∑x∈C−C⊥ |x〉 = |1111111〉+ |1110000〉+ |1001100〉+ |0101010〉
+ |1000011〉+ |0100101〉+ |0011001〉.
Notice that
∣∣0〉 is an equal superposition of all the even-weight Hamming codewords, and ∣∣1〉 is
an equal superposition of all the odd-weight ones. This comes from the fact that C⊥ ⊂ C, which
implies several properties that make the Steane code useful for fault tolerance. In particular, the
logical Hadamard gate can be implemented transversally, that is, H = H⊗7. This fact is also crucial
in the construction we use for the Toffoli ancilla state, used to implement the Toffoli gate.
A.4 Quantum gates and measurement
X and Z gates correspond to the application of the respective Pauli matrices. CZ and CNOT are
the controlled version of these gates, that is, they’re linear operators with
CNOT(|a〉, |b〉) = (|a〉, |a+ b〉)
CZ(|a〉, α|0〉+ β|1〉) = (|a〉, α|0〉+ β(−1)a|1〉)
Measurements are operations that take a quantum state as input and have a classical outcome.
A measurement in the Z basis of an arbitrary qubit α|0〉+β|1〉 returns 0 with probability |α2| and
1 with probability |β2|. A measurement in the X basis works similarly, by writing the state in the
X basis: measuring α|+〉+ β|−〉 gives 0 with probability |α2| and 1 with probability |β2|.
Appendix B: Construction of the Shor state
The circuit to construct the Shor state is shown in Figure 6a. After it interacts with the data, we
measure its syndrome using the circuit in Figure 6b in order to diagnose a possible fault in the
preparation.
We need to show that there’s a decoding procedure such that any possible errors introduced
in the encoding of the Shor state leads to different error syndromes, which could then be used to
correct any errors it might have caused in the circuit. First let’s look at all the possible multiple Z
error patterns resulting from a single fault that might occur during encoding. Those are shown by
the numbers in Figure 6a. All the other possibilities either lead to a single error in the output or
to the same error pattern as one of those.
The error patterns, in the order given by the figure, are Z1Z2, Z1Z2Z3, Z5Z6Z7 and Z6Z7. The
decoding circuit (Figure 6b) propagates these errors to Z1Z2Z6, Z1Z2Z3Z6Z7, Z2Z4Z6Z7 and Z6Z7
respectively. Thus all possible error patterns give different syndromes, making them correctable.
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Figure 6: (a) Preparation of the Shor state |even7〉. The numbers indicate positions where errors
introduced there cause multiple errors in the output. (b) Syndrome measurement for the Shor
state.
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